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Editorial:  
Full legal compliance with The Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period – some lessons 
Once, it would have been treated as a momentous achievement. Some considered it almost 
impossible.  Now, many may be surprised and puzzled, because compliance with the Kyoto Protocol 
runs so counter to assumptions born of nurtured scepticism and/or misunderstandings. Still others 
may see it as irrelevant, as the world moved on at COP21 in Paris, or assume that somehow Parties 
cheated. But the analysis presented in this issue by Shishlov and his colleagues, documenting 100% 
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol’s first period commitments, 1 is in reality none of the above.  If 
not momentous, it is certainly not irrelevant, and it carries important lessons. 
Kyoto compliance: form and numbers 
Of course, 100% compliance needs to be qualified by the non-participation of the US and the formal 
withdrawal of Canada (defended largely with reference to the refusal of its dominant neighbour to 
ratify), along with the fact that developing countries did not have quantified commitments.  
The collective task of the remaining 36 countries with quantified commitments – the ‘Annex-B 2012’ 
countries - was very lop-sided, with potential shortfalls in many of the OECD countries alongside vast 
surplus in the post-Soviet era ‘countries with Economies in Transition’ (EiTs), led by Russia and 
Ukraine. The 1990 base year emissions of the 36 countries, totalling 12 GtCO2/yr, divided almost 
equally between EiTs and the rest.  EiT emissions collapsed by 38% to the commitment period, but 
the others also slightly reduced their emissions in aggregate.   
The various Kyoto flexibility mechanisms (along with land-use rules), complicate assessment; nine 
countries relied on imported emission credits to secure compliance. However, Shishlov et al (2016) 
demonstrate not only individual and collective compliance, but that it did not hinge on what came to 
be termed the EiTs ‘hot air’ surplus.2 Compliance did rely on project credits: about 300 MtCO2 
annually during the period was secured from certified emission reduction projects in developing 
countries through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and about half as much again came 
from similar project-based credits generated within the Annex-B-2012 countries (‘Joint 
Implementation’).  Smaller volumes of national allowances were transferred directly, many (but 
probably not all) linked to ‘Green investment schemes’ to assuage concerns about the 
environmental legitimacy of such trades. 
It is impossible to disentangle precisely the contribution of overt domestic emission reduction (and 
land use policy changes) to realised net emissions, but it is clear that the participating countries, 
especially those in the OECD, did make substantial policy efforts with material impact (Fankhauser et 
al 2016).  
Implications of compliance  
The first significant conclusion is that international law matters.  This will come as no surprise to 
international lawyers (who often offer the observation that international law is complied with 
almost as much as domestic law). But in the wider debate, one common assertion was that because 
there is no central authority with enforcement powers, the legal nature of Kyoto’s commitments 
                                                          
1 Aside from the technicality of Ukrainian reporting being incomplete by the deadline, as indicated in Shishlov 
et al (2016), see http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/tpr/ukr.pdf). 
2  Total emissions of the Annex-B countries were 2.4GtCO2 below their Kyoto allowance, whereas Shishlov et al 
estimate ‘hot air’ as about 2.2GtCO2 (annual averages over the five-year commitment period. 
were of little relevance. Some economists argued that the Protocol’s compliance mechanism was 
self-defeating, because the penalties include automatic deductions from subsequent period 
commitments (in effect, “borrowing”) which they argued would simply deter future participation (or 
be offset by the tabling of very generous targets).   
The fact that Canada utilised the Protocol’s formal procedures for withdrawal – just weeks before 
the final deadline for meaningfully doing so3 – can of course be read in various ways. But it certainly 
showed that even the climate- and UN-sceptical government of Stephen Harper, having eschewed 
any pretence of trying to get Canada’s emissions under control, preferred strongly to avoid non-
compliance; and sought to justify the legally legitimate route of withdrawal in part on the grounds 
that US non-participation left Canada unreasonably exposed compared to its original expectations.    
Whichever way ones looks at it, 100% compliance demonstrates the extent to which advanced 
countries take international law seriously, despite the popular scepticism thrown at the concept. 
Quite how various forms of international law interact with domestic policy is a complex topic, 
touched on below. 
Impact  
Of course, compliance does not itself equate to impact. A significant body of literature claims that 
countries only sign up to commitments that require them to do very little.  
At the time it certainly did not look like that to many analysts.  Widely-promoted results from the 
Stanford Energy Modeling Forum across 11 different models projected that without action, west-
European CO2 emissions would by 2010 grow by 12-55%, and Japanese by 20-33%, relative to the 
1990 baseline. Relative to this, signing up to Kyoto looked like a huge commitment (Weyant and Hill, 
1999). The former (EU-15 countries) ended up about 10% below; Japan, about 6% above.  
The models predicted that delivering the west-European target of -8% domestically would require a 
carbon price-equivalent well over $40/tCO2 and cost $35-170bn annually.  Most models suggested 
the relative effort required for Japan to be even greater, a qualitative insight which could help 
explain Japan’s much greater reliance on international credits.  
At minimum, the outcome – indeed, the huge degree of over-compliance – illustrates at a national 
level a remarkably consistent pattern in most quantity-based environmental legislation on industry: 
targets which at the outset are viewed as onerous, challenging and costly have usually proven to be 
far easier to meet than expected (Grubb and Ferrario, 2006). The final costs of Kyoto to the 
participating countries have been a tiny fraction of those projected in the EMF Kyoto studies, and 
this cannot be attributed primarily to the non-participation of North America.4  
But nor have the costs or efforts been negligible. Obviously the global recession from 2008 curtailed 
emissions – and may do much to explain the degree of overcompliance. But the efforts of the EU to 
ensure compliance were substantial; Japan’s expenditure through the international flexibility 
mechanisms even more so, and the same is true of many of the other OECD countries in the Kyoto 
                                                          
3 Canada formally announced its withdrawal on 12th December 2011, saying the costs of meeting the targets 
would be unacceptable, referring to US non-participation and blaming the previous Liberal government for 
agreeing to targets without clear implementation.  Parties have to give one year’s formal notification of 
withdrawal so this meant Canada was no longer a Party to the Protocol by the end of the commitment period, 
against which compliance has to be formally assessed. 
4 It is of course impossible to analyse precisely a hypothetical case of North American participation; its impact 
on the rest would be have been negligible had the US and Canada complied through domestic actions or 
purchase of the Russian and Ukrainian surplus, but more significant had they competed for CDM credits. 
system.  The fact that Japan managed to comply despite the total closure of its nuclear stations after 
the Fukushima disaster, just under two-thirds of the way through the commitment period, remains 
testament to its large compliance effort before that.  It is all the more striking from a country which 
in the 2001 negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol’s ‘rulebook’ (the Marrakech Accords) had made plain 
its unease at participating without the US, and earned a reputation of being deeply hostile to the 
notion of any significant compliance mechanism (though, much later, it was admitted that this was 
in part a negotiating ploy to gain other concessions).  
Relative to the early and widely promoted estimates, compliance indeed appears to be a 
tremendous achievement; viewed with hindsight, much can be attributed to other factors (like the 
global recession). In reality it is hard to disentangle the many influences on emissions, and even 
harder to attribute actions and outcomes to a single motivation such as ‘need for compliance’, 
though recent quantitative research does suggest positive causality.5  Serious ex-post study to 
disentangle these factors would be far more valuable than a disingenuous ‘oh well that was always 
going to be easy’ from those sceptical about international law – particularly from those who fifteen 
years earlier said compliance would be almost impossible. 
Narrative and symbolism 
A third insight concerns the ‘stories told’ about Kyoto.  
It has come to symbolise many things, including a contest between a “Kyoto top-down” and “Paris 
bottom-up” image, to which recent narratives would tend to add “top-down = bad” and “bottom-up 
= good” respectively. The real distinction is, however, at best very fuzzy. No-one imposed the Kyoto 
Protocol targets from the ‘top down’; the major countries arrived in Kyoto with emission target 
proposals that had been prepared domestically and announced internationally throughout the 
previous year, much like the Paris INDCs. Apart from the legally binding context, the distinction was 
that the big players sought a collective agreement with minimal differentiation – the same reduction 
from 1990 levels -  and the final numbers were hammered out chiefly as a compromise between the 
US and EU positions: bottom-up, but with a degree of top-down pressure.  The result had an 
element of collective effort-sharing for the big OECD countries; others (like Russia, Ukraine and 
Australia) simply retained their national offers). It was a million miles from a top-down goal 
distributed by a centralised formula. 
The post-Kyoto lobbying, and the narrative that it sought to establish in the popular mind 
spearheaded by the Bush administration, was however striking in its intensity and ultimate impact. 
The formal central focus of the attack, namely that only the industrialised countries had emission 
targets, did not in fact stem from Kyoto, but was an extension of the framework established in the 
UNFCCC itself (ratified under Bush senior) that required industrialised countries to take the lead in 
curbing emissions.   
                                                          
5 One initial attempt is indeed the article by Fankhauser et al (2016). In their formal test they looked at the 
incidence of domestic climate legislation in the four years after Kyoto was adopted in 1997, which saw a small 
positive correlation in Annex I country legislation but negative in non-Annex I.  In fact those four years 
correspond with the international negotiation of the implementing rules, and most countries said they would 
not ratify the Protocol until those negotiations were completed (with the Marrakech Accords in December 
2001).  A more relevant question, therefore, would be to study the adoption of climate laws either after 
national ratification (2002-5), or after entry into force (2005 onwards).  Overall they find ‘… for Annex I 
countries, the Protocol has led to the expected increase in legislative activity … we find statistically higher 
legislation activity after 2001 .. the difference persists until 2009’.  
The irony is that the survival of the Kyoto Protocol itself was a crucial factor enabling the world to 
move beyond that divide. Kyoto was the embodiment of the industrialised countries’ obligation to 
lead, as agreed under the UNFCCC. The fact that it came into force, followed by the negotiation of 
second period commitments under the Copenhagen Accord’s acceptance of ‘twin track’ 
negotiations, was vital in enabling the world to move forward with global negotiations on universal 
contributions.  The fact of 100% compliance now becomes a symbol of industrialised country 
leadership, albeit without North America’s formal participation. Conversely for the US in particular, 
it’s non-participation symbolises its insistence on ‘level playing field’ in particular with China, and the 
need for global effort on a global problem, as well as its unease about binding international 
commitments.  
Of course the Protocol did help to stimulate global engagement, not least through the CDM. Related 
complaints about the treaty’s ‘obsession’ with mitigation overlooked the fact that it was Kyoto which 
introduced the Adaptation fund – the first international fund dedicated to adaptation - with an 
automatic revenue stream generated from a share of proceeds on CDM investments. Perhaps the 
struggle over symbolism now will be between views of Kyoto as costly mistake, or as an essential 
and valuable step towards the global (but differentiated) structure embodied at Paris.  
The myth of universality   
Fourth, the Kyoto experience raises questions about whether any single legal form can really be 
usefully universally applicable. ‘What you see depends on where you sit’, and even academic 
debates reflect regional conditions and experiences.  David Victor and I had a well-publicised 
disagreement on Kyoto, reflecting our respective books on the Protocol (Victor (2001); Grubb (1999, 
2001)).  David Victor argued that countries would never accept quantified commitments that were 
both legally binding and significant in their requirements.  In turn, I argued that legally binding 
commitments implemented with Kyoto-like flexibility mechanisms were important in solving the 
problem.   
In the US, “Kyoto” became a demonised punchbag that probably set back any sensible approach for 
years. In Europe, it became the legal centrepiece of binding controls on almost half of Europe’s CO2 
emissions, generating the world’s dominant effort at carbon pricing – and the first period Kyoto 
targets were instrumental in preventing even greater inflation of the system than would otherwise 
have occurred.  EU emissions declined substantially even as the ETS itself was eclipsed by recession, 
huge efforts on renewable energy – and international credits. Japan took a different route, but both 
regions proved willing to invest substantial amounts in developing country emission reduction 
projects, which – albeit initially a US proposal - remained far more controversial in North America.  
 
The subsequent developments have been similarly telling. Freed from the spectre of binding UN-
based commitments against which to rail, US policy has arguably been making more headway. 
Without that clarity and legal coherence to empower the European Commission, the EU’s domestic 
policy is in danger of falling apart.  At the time it seemed like David Victor and I were in fundamental 
disagreement; with hindsight one might argue that we were both right, but reflecting different 
contexts. Reviewers of this editorial have suggested that maybe Japan and the EU (along with 
Norway, New Zealand and Switzerland) are exceptional in their willingness to adhere to international 
law. US scholars argue that the US is no less committed to international law, which is why it refused 
to ratify in the first place an agreement that did not match its domestic political realities.  
Characteristics, benefits and risks of international flexibilities 
Finally, the nature of Kyoto’s compliance sheds important light on the role – the benefits, the risks, 
and the realities - of international emissions trading, and flexibility mechanisms more generally.  The 
flexibility mechanisms overall have proved pivotal to enabling compliance – without them, Japan and 
several others would have had to follow the Canadian route.  
Yet the outcome is unexpected in form. On the surface, emissions trading between countries with 
targets is simpler, cheaper and more effective than the cumbersome requirement for project-based 
crediting through the CDM.  Kyoto’s provisions for ‘Joint Implementation’, of project-based credits 
between countries with targets which thereby involved far lighter governance than the CDM, 
offered a middle way.  It might have been expected that countries needing to use the mechanisms 
would draw on them in the corresponding order – ET, JI and CDM.   
The reality turned out precisely opposite. Because of its collective governance and as a way of 
engaging developing countries in the global effort, the CDM was perceived as politically preferable.  
Aided also by early start provisions, and delays including tortuous complexities around the 
relationship of JI and EU ETS in many of the eastern European  nations who were the natural hosts 
for JI projects, the CDM took off at unexpected scale. Despite concerns and substantial academic 
critique and debate (eg. see exchange between Michaelowa, 2011 and Bohm and Dhabi, 2011), it is 
also credited with having contributed enormously to the building of capacity and launch of 
renewable energy industries especially in Asia – which is a major global contribution to the effort 
which now has a strong life of its own.   
Along the way, the post-Soviet surplus generated huge and acrimonious debate.  From the Russian 
perspective, those excess emission credits may not have been due to climate policy, but they were 
certainly not ‘free’ – they reflected an incredibly painful economic collapse, which as a by-product 
generated global environmental benefits and for which they viewed some compensation through 
Kyoto as appropriate, and promised. The rest of the world did not see it that way. The CDM was 
preferred, JI became a poor cousin, and intergovernmental emissions trading was marginalised 
except where, in a few cases, it was backed by the commitment of recipients to use the revenues for 
emission reduction programmes (the ‘Green Investment Schemes’). Law and economics are not the 
only determinants of outcomes.  
The initial targets and emission outcomes also shed light on the psychology, beliefs and realities that 
underlay projections and associated negotiations. This includes the paradox that whilst logically one 
might expect the most carbon intensive economies have most scope to reduce emissions, the 
political positions were almost exactly the opposite. The outcome is mixed and its prediction, even if 
possible, would anyway have been ignored.6   
The facts of huge surplus (particularly from macroeconomic transition), poor forecasting and 
complex roles for flexible mechanisms have implications both for the understanding of the Paris 
INDCs, and the risks and benefits of international emissions trading. It seems apparent already that 
the Chinese INDC may be easily and hugely surpassed as its economy undergoes radical 
                                                          
6 At Kyoto, Russia in particular was fixated with the idea that its emissions, having collapsed in the economic 
transition, needed to grow again to 1990 levels as part of recovery. President Putin’s then economic advisor, 
Andrei Illarionov, led a concerted campaign on this basis and dismissed the view that inefficient and carbon 
intensive production was part of Russia’s economic problem, not its solution, but that latter view has proved 
closer to reality. The mindset was however unshakable. The Australian insistence on a big growth target (8% 
above 1990 levels) and of course the US industry lobbying has some parallels. The real insight is that intensive 
dependence on fossil fuels tends to fuel perspectives, politics and investments which support continuation of 
those patterns and interests, and transitions away from this are politically and often economically painful.  
macroeconomic transition, and established programmes on efficiency and renewables rise further in 
scale. Consider then the parallel universe promoted by many economic theorists (and once, many 
OECD governments),  in which an OECD carbon market in 2015 would lead on to a globally linked 
market in 2020, presumably embodying targets based on something like the quantitative INDCs that 
were offered in the run-up to Paris. Such a hypothetical system might rapidly be swamped by a 
growing Chinese surplus, on a scale which could during the 2020s come to dwarf even the Russian 
surplus under Kyoto’s first period.   
The world is uncertain and assumptions can change more slowly than economic trends. If one fixes 
quantified commitments, handle with care. With global participation of countries at all stages of 
development, the emphasis on review and ratcheting embodied in the Paris agreement thereby has 
much to commend it.  
Compare and contrast: Kyoto and the Paris Agreement  
Thus finally, Kyoto’s outcome puts a spotlight on the differences, similarities and omissions between 
the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. From a standpoint of mitigation content, the most 
glaring differences are of course the global participation embodied in the Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs, dropping the “intended”) and the emphasis of legal commitments on the 
national processes rather than outcomes, along with global goals. There is real and legitimate 
concern about whether many developing countries have adequate governance to implement their 
INDCs, and the lack of binding obligation is unlikely to help in this. There will be no moment like the 
present one, when countries can be declared in or out of compliance. Correspondingly there is no 
binding driver of overseas investment as part of a compliance strategy – though comparisons are 
already being drawn between JI/CDM and the Paris Agreement’s Article 6, hinged on the assumption 
that industrialised countries are domestically committed to delivering their INDCs including 
international offsets under, at minimum, the watchful eye of the UNFCCC.  
A big omission is the lack of common metrics and accounting system underpinning the NDCs. 
Comparability, and even meaning, of the INDCs will be contested and more difficult than the 
numerical clarity of Kyoto.  Yet, the Paris text is replete with commitment to avoid double counting, 
and its emphasis on transparency already goes some way towards enabling common approaches. 
Indeed, negotiations on the Paris Agreement’s reporting rules might naturally draw on the rigorous 
accounting system developed under the Kyoto Protocol.   
For the similarities are also profound. The mushy academic flirtation of the anti-Kyoto literature with 
‘policy-based’ negotiations never took hold; it had proved impossible amongst 38 countries in the 
Kyoto negotiations and was inconceivable with almost 200 for the Paris Agreement. Countries can 
offer or negotiate goals, not domestic implementation policies, so just like Kyoto, that is where we 
ended up at Paris. The goals, moreover, are to be reviewed every five years, just as under the Kyoto 
Protocol. The Paris Agreements’ commitment to facilitate delivery of INDCs echoes the facilitative 
branch of the Kyoto compliance mechanism. All this says something very fundamental about what 
constitutes a feasible international architecture for tackling climate change. And the collective Aims 
set out in the Paris headline, along with specific goals (early peaking on the way to a ‘balance of 
sources and sinks’) with regular stocktaking, take the global framework much further than Kyoto.  
In many ways, the relationship between the two agreements can and doubtless will be cast in many 
diverse lights. The Paris Agreement’s wholehearted embracement of differentiation can be seen an 
emphatic rejection of Kyoto’s efforts to forge a common basis relative to 1990 levels. At the same 
time, critics of this came to acknowledge that increasing differentiation over time has always 
featured in the evolution of international regimes: start simple, and get more nuanced.  In one 
sense, Paris delivered this inevitable evolution in one big bound, albeit perhaps at a price.  
Arguably, Paris offers a framework also for differentiation in legal form, for example if groups of 
countries now choose to collaborate in giving more legal clarity to either their quantified goals or 
elements of policies to deliver them. Indeed crucial to the effort (and research) will be developing a 
more sophisticated understanding of how international law in different areas may interact with 
different aspects of policy formation, within countries that have very diverse political and legal 
cultures.  
Within the international regime we now have the odd situation in which the Kyoto system still exists 
alongside the Paris Agreement. Only a small clutch of countries have ratified their Kyoto second 
period commitments, which extend to 2020(the Polish veto means the EU is unlikely to do so, 
though that is largely symbolic since Poland is already legally bound under the EU’s domestic 
legislation). The US and Canada are not Parties to it, and Japan and Russia refused to adopt any 
targets. The meaning of a Kyoto Protocol in legal existence but with only a small handful of targets is 
unclear.   
Back in 2011, with the world still reeling from the collapse of the Copenhagen summit, I suggested 
that any plausible evolution of a Kyoto-like system would have to grapple with at least two 
fundamental challenges (Grubb 2011). One was globalisation – the challenge on which Paris focused, 
and delivered. The other is incentives, and in particular the adverse incentives to avoid any 
meaningful controls on industrial emissions for fear of ‘carbon leakage’ and the associated rhetoric 
of ‘competitiveness’.  In the warm glow of Paris, the challenge of incentives for effective 
participation and implementation remains, and to this is added the challenges of governance and 
national accountability without common accounting, but with collectively agreed Aims and goals.  
Whether any fusion can be devised, to start combining some of the best structural elements of both 
agreements – and to fill in the gaps - remains a question for the future.  But achieving 100% 
compliance with the first set of binding commitments under the climate change regime, whilst 
learning the many lessons, along with a world reunited at Paris, is not such a bad place to be – even 
if it took us quarter of a Century and many political traumas to get here.  
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